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Alternative Practice Structures - An Analysis of How the Current Independence
Rules for Auditors of Public Companies Might be Applied (An Addendum to Issue
Summary 98-2)

Under the current independence rules, presumably written with only traditionallystructured accounting firms in mind, all “Members” (as defined), are precluded from
having most loans to and from, and any direct or material indirect financial interest in,
attest clients. In addition, in all but a few limited circumstances, auditors are precluded
from providing bookkeeping and certain other services to public attest clients. Loans and
direct financial interests, as well as the provision of certain services, are generally
prohibited without regard to materiality under the current rules.

In general terms, a “Member” is defined as the firm, all of its partners, those providing
professional services to the client, and those managerial employees in an office
participating in a significant portion of the engagement.

Fundamental Concept

In trying to apply the current independence rules to alternative practice structures (APS),
the fundamental question is whether one believes that the AttestFirm and PublicCo. are
separate, independent operations.
If one were to look through the separate legal ownership of PublicCo. and AttestFirm,
and the measures taken to separate effective control of AttestFirm from PublicCo.
management and to enhance the individual identities of the two in the public’s eye,
concluding that these efforts were (1) more form over substance, and that (2) the dual
employment status of AttestFirm partners, and the administrative and employee leasing
arrangements between PublicCo. and AttestFirm, effectively negate most of the
separation and distinctness afforded by the legal structure of the two, then it seems that in
applying the current rules, PublicCo. would be precluded from having loans to and from,
and direct and material indirect financial interests in attest clients. In addition, PublicCo.
could not perform bookkeeping and certain other services for attest clients, and could not
have any of the business relationships or contingent fee arrangements with attest clients
barred to traditional firms (i.e., PublicCo. would be deemed a “Member”). In
determining the financial interests and other relationships, if any, that PublicCo. officers
and employees could not have with AttestFirm clients, the definition of “Member” might
also have to be further revised to describe those PublicCo. officers and employees that
would be equivalent to the partners and managers of a traditional firm.
On the other hand, if one were to respect the legal separation and the measures intended
to enhance the operational and distinctness of the two entities, believing that these efforts

were effective in isolating the operations and control of AttestFirm, then you would not
prohibit many relationships between PublicCo. and AttestFirm clients. Proponents of this
view, however, concede that the dual employment status of AttestFirm partners poses
some special risks to auditor independence. They would apply certain restrictions to
PublicCo. and certain of its managers to protect the auditor from undue influence arising
from his or her concurrent PublicCo. employment.

In addition, PublicCo. / AttestFirm relationships have been structured in different ways,
and any application of the rules to these alternative practice structures would have to be
adapted to fit the particular circumstances. For example, we understand that there have
been instances where AttestFirm partners have joined PublicCo., severing their ties and
financial relationships with AttestFirm, and leaving behind one or more partners to own
and manage AttestFirm. These remaining AttestFirm partners do not become employees
of PublicCo., although the AttestFirm has administrative and employee leasing
agreements with PublicCo. similar to those in the traditional model. As neither the
current nor the former partners of AttestFirm have dual employment status (i.e., they are
not both owner-employees of AttestFirm and employees of PublicCo.), any threat of
PublicCo. influence over AttestFirm partners would be mitigated. AttestFirm partners
might still be influenced by PublicCo. if, in the course of performing an audit,
PublicCo.’s interests in or relationships with an attest client were jeopardized, and
PublicCo. could restrict access to needed employees or services - employees and services
that possibly could not be acquired elsewhere on a timely basis. In addition, leased staff
may influenced by their PublicCo. employment. However, it would seem that the
employment independence of these AttestFirm partners would at least mitigate many of
the threats to independence posed by PublicCo. relationships with AttestFirm clients.
The following describes several views put forth to apply or adapt the independence rules
to alternative practice structures. These views were not necessarily developed with the
primary aim of applying the existing independence rules for auditors of public companies
to alternative practice structures. Any consensus on an appropriate application could, of
course, contain elements of one or more of the following proposals. As in the original
issue summary, since we are only concerned with the independence of auditors of SEC
registrants, assume that all discussion relates to AttestFirm’s public clients.

View A
Proponents of View A would restrict virtually all PublicCo. relationships with and
financial interests in AttestFirm clients that would be prohibited between a traditional
firm and its audit clients. They would prohibit PublicCo. loans to AttestFirm clients,
deposit relationships, investment advisory and broker/dealer services, ownership of
AttestFirm client securities, bookkeeping and payroll services, receipt of contingent fees,
etc. Although prohibiting most corporate relationships that a traditional firm could not
have with an attest client, View A proponents have not suggested restrictions on
PublicCo. managers’ personal investments in and relationships with AttestFirm clients.
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View A proponents have not addressed whether PublicCo. products (e.g., insurance
policies) should be sold to AttestFirm clients.

In effect, View A proponents have “swept” PublicCo. and its subsidiaries into the
definition of “Member,” concluding that the separation between PublicCo. and
AttestFirm is artificial and insubstantial, but have not included any of its officers or
employees, which differs from the approach taken by View B and View C proponents.

View B
View B proponents respect the legal separation and the measures intended to enhance the
operational and perceived distinctness of the PublicCo. and AttestFirms in an alternative
practice structure. However, they would impose additional restrictions of the activities
and relationships that PublicCo. and certain of its managers could have with AttestFirm
clients, in recognition of threats to independence posed by AttestFirm partners’ PublicCo.
employment. They suggest that the definition of “Member” be extended to include those
individuals in PublicCo. who directly supervise AttestFirm partners when they perform
work on behalf of PublicCo., the managers working in offices participating in a
significant portion of the engagement, and the entities within PublicCo. in which such
immediate supervisors work. Because these supervisors, subsidiaries, and managers
would now be deemed “Members” under the auditing literature, they too would be
precluded from having financial interests, loans, direct business relationships, etc. with
AttestFirm clients.

This lack of personal interests and relationships with AttestFirm clients might prevent
direct supervisors from attempting to exercise control over or influencing the audit
partners whom they supervise. These disinterested supervisors might also act as a buffer
between audit partners and PublicCo. upper management members that may have
personal interests in or be responsible for corporate relationships with AttestFirm clients.

In addition, proponents of this view would prohibit PublicCo., its subsidiaries, and
individuals who indirectly supervise, indirectly control, or could be perceived as
influencing a Member from having a material relationship with an AttestFirm client, or
an investment that would allow the investor to exercise significant influence over the
AttestFirm client. They define materiality with respect to the individual’s net worth and
PublicCo.’s consolidated financial statements (but not with respect to the attest client).
These additional individuals and entities also could not be connected with an AttestFirm
client as a promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, director, or officer.
View B proponents would not consider the owners of one AttestFirm “Members” with
respect to the attest clients of another AttestFirm, unless the owners of one performed
services in another. For example, if owners of AttestFirm A performed services in
AttestFirm B, such owners would be considered owners of both AttestFirms for purposes
of applying the independence rules. View B proponents would not restrict the services or
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relationships that one AttestFirm could provide to another’s attest clients, as long as the
owners of the individual firms only provided services from within their separate firms.

View C

Others might argue that, without the liberty to change existing independence standards,
the expanded “Member” definition suggested by View B proponents does not go far
enough; they would say that all normally prohibited business relationships and
investments between PublicCo. officers and management and AttestFirm clients impair
the auditor’s independence. They point out that under the current independence rules,
every partner is precluded from investing in or having certain business relationships with
his or her firm’s attest clients - even if the partner resides on the opposite side of the
country from where the attest engagement is being performed, and regardless of the
materiality of the investment or relationship to either the partner or the client. Following
the logic of the current rule, they would ask why even an immaterial business relationship
between, say, the PublicCo. CEO and an AttestFirm client would not impair the auditor’s
independence.

In addition, while the expanded definition of “Member” (View B) proponents would
restrict the financial interests of other individuals and entities within PublicCo. that could
have indirect control or influence over the auditor, they would allow PublicCo. entities
and employees outside of the expanded Member group to perform services that the
auditor would be prohibited from providing directly (e.g., bookkeeping and asset custody
services), or enter into contingent fee arrangements with AttestFirm clients.. Proponents
of View C say that the auditor’s employer should not be allowed to provide services to or
have relationships with the auditor’s clients that the auditor could not provide or have
directly, even if the auditor performs the audit under the auspices of a firm not owned by
his employer.
View C proponents might equate the people and entities in the “Member” definition to
PublicCo. as follows:

Personnel and Entities in the Current
Member Definition
Firm

PublicCo. Equivalent

PublicCo., its subsidiaries,1 and affiliated
AttestFirms.3
Upper management (all PublicCo.
managers at the attest partner’s level or
higher).2
Managerial employees in offices
participating in a significant portion of the
engagement.
Professionals assigned / leased to
participate on the engagement.

Partners

Managerial employees in offices
participating in a significant portion of the
engagement.
Professional employees assigned to the
engagement.
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1 Inclusion of the firm within the current definition of “Member” addresses permitted
versus prohibited corporate financial interests, business relationships, services provided,
etc. The current definition as applied to an accounting firm may include the entire
worldwide firm depending on its structure / management and profit-sharing provisions,
even though the firm may have several distinct divisions or units based on geography
(organized by region or nation), function (audit, tax, and consulting), or profit center
(perhaps organized by industries served). We’ve included all of PublicCo. and its
subsidiaries in the expanded “Member” definition, to reflect the broad application of the
rule to the traditional firm. The implied conclusion here is twofold: (1) that the auditor’s
employer should not have relationships with or provide services to the auditor’s clients
that the auditor could not provide directly, even if the auditor performs the audit under
the auspices of a firm not owned by his employer, and (2) that if the current
independence rules apply to the entire traditional firm, ignoring the separateness of
national units and the separation between the audit and consulting practices, for example,
then the rules should apply to PublicCo. and all of its subsidiaries.

2 The current rules specify that all partners are “Members” when determining personal
independence restrictions, even if they are in the consulting or tax practices, and far
removed from an attest partner’s office and profit center. The current definition captures
the attest partner’s colleagues, direct supervisors, and all more senior people in the firm
(colleagues include a partner at the same level or junior to the attest partner). Direct
supervisors and more senior management are included to prevent the risk that personal
financial interests or relationships with attest clients would enable them to exert influence
over the attest partner (or the attest partner’s judgment would be affected, knowing senior
management’s interests in the attest client, even without overt attempts to influence the
attest partner). Presumably, the partner’s contemporaries and those more junior are
included because of the collegiality that the partnership structure engenders, because of
appearances, and perhaps even administrative ease in applying the rule.
With regard to personal investments and relationships, the solution proposed here, to
include all PublicCo. personnel at the attest partner’s level and higher in the definition of
“Member,” is similar to the group included in a traditional firm. In applying this rule, for
practical purposes, PublicCo. would have to designate some minimum level of
management as the floor for determining those included as “Members.”
3 Note that the current definition of Member would already pick up the other attest
partners at AttestFirm that also work at PublicCo. (as well as PublicCo. personnel
working on the engagement). The solution proposed here would also pick up attest
partners from other AttestFirms affiliated with PublicCo. (assuming that the would fall
within the definition of “upper management” as used here), but does not address what
relationships AttestFirms could have with each other’s clients. If we conclude that Attest
Firm and PublicCo. should be considered one and the same for purposes of applying the
independence rules, then it would seem that AttestFirms, affiliated by virtue of the shared
PublicCo. employment of their owner-managers, should not have normally prohibited
relationships with each other’s clients. Indeed, if this were allowed, a national firm might
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argue that its individual offices should be allowed to have relationships with each other’s
clients that would normally impair independence under certain circumstances - if, for
example, partners were compensated based on office profitability rather than a firmwide,
or divisional calculation, and other measures were taken to enhance the separateness of
office units.

Other Issues
PublicCo. Shareholders
The proposals described thus far do not address whether restrictions on the activities of
PublicCo. shareholders with respect to AttestFirm clients are necessary or feasible. If
restrictions were placed on the relationships that PublicCo. senior managers could have
with attest clients, should these restrictions extend up to PublicCo. shareholders?
Certainly the owners of a traditional firm are subject to these restrictions.

One important distinction is that the owners of a traditional firm are, or have been,
actively involved in its operations and management (independence restrictions extend to
retired partners, who are receiving retirement benefits that vary based on current earnings
as opposed to fixed benefits - these retired partners could be likened to passive
shareholders, except that retired partners have a long history of active participation in the
day-to-day operations of the firm, and most likely have some close ties to current
management). Some would argue that this distinction is significant enough to justify
leaving PublicCo. shareholders out of the “Member” definition. They would point out
that inclusion of shareholders is not feasible, and the threat to auditor independence is not
clear in a widely-held PublicCo., where ownership is not concentrated in any one
individual or group. Should restrictions apply, however, to a PublicCo. shareholder that
has a twenty or thirty percent ownership interest? Some would argue that auditor
independence might be compromised, if such a shareholder also had, say, a significant
interest in an AttestFirm client.
AttestFirm Client Stock Investments in PublicCo.
Another issue not yet addressed is whether restrictions are appropriate on the stock
investments AttestFirm client has in PublicCo., a situation not covered in the current
literature. However, loans by an attest client to the audit firm are prohibited, and it would
seem that equity investments would be prohibited for the same reasons. The threats to
auditor independence are twofold:

■

■

that the AttestFirm client, as a significant shareholder of PublicCo., could exert
influence over an AttestFirm partner to obtain a favorable accounting treatment.
that the AttestFirm partner would not be objective in assessing the value of equity
investments that were not publicly-traded, or in evaluating the need for or magnitude
of a charge for an other-than-temporary decline in value.
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■

that an AttestFirm client’s holding of PublicCo. stock would create an unacceptable
“mutuality of interests” between the client, PublicCo., and the AttestFirm partner.

It would seem that those who believe that PublicCo.’s financial interests in AttestFirm
clients should be restricted would also believe that AttestFirm clients’ financial interests
in PublicCo. should be restricted. The potential threat to auditor independence does not
seem imposing if the client is an insignificant shareholder of PublicCo., and if the client’s
holdings are immaterial to the client. However, materiality has not been considered in
the current literature on direct financial interests between auditors and clients.

Commissions
Under the current rules, the acceptance of commissions by the auditor for referring attest
clients to brokers, insurance agents, bankers, etc, is prohibited, presumably because the
auditor could end up auditing the value or financial consequences of a product or service
that he or she was paid to recommend. Some would argue that the AttestFirm partner’s
independence may be impaired if he or she referred attest clients to PublicCo. for
products, as salary increases or bonuses could be used to compensate the AttestFirm
partner for these referrals. Others might argue, however, that it’s not the act of being
paid for these referrals that would impair the auditor’s independence per se, but the illfated recommendation itself that causes a problem (which could be exacerbated by the
client’s knowledge that the auditor was paid for the referral). The fact that the auditor
advised the client might cause the auditor to be overly optimistic in auditing the results or
consequences of that advice. Uncompensated referrals, however, are not necessarily
prohibited.
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